Instructions on Death: Guiding the Jury’s Sentencing Discretion in Capital Cases by Ellmann, Stephen
digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship Other Publications
1986
Instructions on Death: Guiding the Jury’s
Sentencing Discretion in Capital Cases
Stephen Ellmann
New York Law School, stephen.ellmann@nyls.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_other_pubs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Other Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
10(3) The Champion 20 (1986)
CAPITAL if CASES -
Instructions on Death: 
Guiding the Jury's Sentencing Discretion in Capital Cases 
by Stephen Ellmann 
Introduction 
The men and women who sit on capital 
juries rarely take their duties lightly. 
Defense counsel tell them-and probably 
they agree-that the decision to take a 
defendant's life is awesome and difficult. 
Unfamiliar with the law, no doubt inex-
perienced in sentencing, the jurors face a 
confusing and painful task. 
For this task jurors naturally seek, and 
the law provides, some guidance. This 
guidance, of course, is delivered by the 
judge in instructions to the jury; these in-
structions have at least three functions, 
each of which may be critically important 
for defense counsel. 
First, instructions may explicate crucial 
legal issues (such as the nature of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances, 
the burdens of proof shouldered by pros-
ecution and defense, the process of 
weighing the various circumstances point-
ing for and against death), and a host of 
other specific points bearing on the jury's 
decision. These points matter. Carefully 
prepared instructions can illuminate the 
· jurors' duties in ways that heighten their 
awareness of their responsibility to avoid 
an improper sentence of death; ill-prepared 
instructions may encourage the jury to 
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view its task as a mechanical one, in which 
the state's accumulation of aggravating cir-
cumstances automatically leads to a death 
sentence. 
Second, even if-as seems likely-many 
of the instructions given by judges are too 
technical, or confusing, or extended for 
jurors to recall their details accurately, the 
instructions given by the court help set the 
mood for the jurors' deliberations. Instruc-
tions that highlight aggravating circum-
stances and give only passing reference to 
mitigating circumstances may lead jurors 
to give more weight to the state's reasons 
for death than they otherwise would; con-
versely, instructions that set out in detail 
the factors or evidence in mitigation may 
encourage jurors to accept those factors as 
significant. Moreover, in closing argument 
counsel can rely on favorable instructions 
and underscore them for the jury while also 
buttressing the closing argument itself. 
Third, the instructions given (and those 
requested but refused) become the basis for 
appeal . .lftimely requests for instructions 
are made, and if timely objections are 
made to instructions that jeopardize the 
defendant's rights, then the client may, 
literally, live to fight another day. 
It goes without saying that instructions 
are vitally important at both guilt and 
penalty phases. This article will focus only 
on the penalty phase, however, and even 
within this field it will not be exhaustive, 
for the range of instructions that defendants 
may need at penalty trials is as broad as 
the range of issues and evidence at those 
trials . In the pages to come I will try only 
to highlight some of the central issues on 
which instructions can be helpful, and the 
sorts of instructions that counsel may want 
to offer on them. The rest, as always, is 
up to the attorneys in each indi 
case. 1 
Preparation and Presentation 
of Instructions 
Precisely because every case will call 
slightly different instructions, it is 
tial for counsel to plan and prepare the 
structions before trial. Just as a 
attorney must devise a theory of the 
that will sustain the defense through 
guilt and sentencing, so he or she 
devise instructions that buttress the 
theory in every way possible. 
The first step, then, is a careful 
ment of the strengths and weaknesses 
the defense case. If, for example, 
defendant's hopes for a life term 
on nonstatutory mitigating cir1:un1Stancert 
counsel should prepare instructions 
highlight the presence of the noJ1StllttulOI 
circumstances and emphasize the 
power (or even duty) to consider 
Otherwise, the mere fact that they are 
specified by the state statute may · 
against the jury's considering them. 
In light of this assessment, counsel 
formulate the instructions that would 
most helpful to the case. Some states 
courts may have form instructions, 
these should certainly be 
although the purpose may be more to 
tify instructions which must be 
than to fmd models whose use 
I . I am grateful to James Liebman, . 
Amsterdam, Timothy K. Ford and DeOIIIS 
for numerous suggestions which I have 
porated into this article, generallY 
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sought. Fortunately, model instructions-
likely to be helpful starting points in almost 
any case-are a~ailable from_ a nu~ber of 
sources, includmg the Califorma State 
Public Defender's California Death Penal-
ty Manual. the Kentucky Public Advocate's 
Death Penalty Manual, the Indiana Public 
Defender Counsel's Death Penalty 
Defense, the Ohio Death Penalty Task 
Force and Criminal Defense Lawyers 
Association's Ohio Death Penalty Manual, 
the Southern Poverty Law Center's Mo-
tions for Capital Cases, and probably 
others. fve drawn extensively on some of 
these sources in the discussion that follows. 
Just as important as the drafting of the 
instructions is the decision on strategy for 
seeking their acceptance by the court. A 
crucial element in this decision, in tum, 
is thorough research of the relevant law. 
Obviously, it is ideal if the instructions the 
case calls for are supported by relevant 
precedent. This precedent may rest on the 
federal constitution, state constitution, or 
state statutes, rules or decisions; all should 
be consulted. 
Even if an instruction is not currently re-
quired by law, it may well make sense to 
request that it be given. The court may, 
after all, have ample discretion to give the 
instruction if it chooses. Moreover, even 
an instruction that is currently rejected by 
governing law may also be well worth re-
questing, if only to secure the issue for ap-
peal. On the other hand, if a case looks 
winnable at trial, it could conceivably be 
best not to raise weak legal claims for im-
proved instructions-if the result may be 
to trigger the prosecution's interest in ob-
taining obstructions that are even worse 
than those otherwise likely to be given. 
Assuming that it makes strategic sense 
to ask for a given instruction, counsel of 
course must decide how vigorously to 
press for its acceptance. But whether a par-
ticular instruction is urgently needed at 
trial, or instead is expected to serve 
Primarily as the basis for argument on ap-
peal, counsel should assert all possible 
legal grounds for its appropriateness. One 
straightforward way of ensuring that im-
portant legal rights are not waived by 
omission is to preface the entire set of pro-
posed instructions with a written motion 
u~ging that they be given, in light of the 
SIXth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
of the United States Constitution and ap-
propriate parts of the state's constitution 
and laws. 
Where an instruction is crucially needed, 
of course, counsel should be prepared to 
press for it. Important Supreme Court 
decisions offer both logic and language that 
can be brought to bear in this effort. 
"[C]areful instructions on the law and how 
to apply it" were endorsed in Gregg v. 
Georgia , 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976) 
(plurality opinion). Indeed, it is difficult . 
to understand how, without clear instruc~ 
tions, sentencing juries can arrive at deci-
sions that provide a "meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which 
[death] is imposed from the many cases in 
which it is not," Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U .S. 238, 313 (1972) (White , J., 
concurring). 
The absence of such instructions in fact 
contributed to the Supreme Court's over-
turning of the death sentence in Godfrey 
v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 429 (1980) 
(plurality opinion). Similarly, in Caldwell 
v. Mississippi, 86 L.Ed.2d 231, 246 
(1985), the Supreme Court struck down a 
death sentence, in part because the trial 
court, rather than giving "a strong curative 
instruction," had expressed agreement with 
comments by the prosecutor that risked 
undermining the jury's sense of respon-
sibility in death sentencing. Moreover, 
even under state statutes that deliberately 
leave some aspects of the sentencing deci-
sion to the jury's discretion-as we now 
know that Georgia does, see Zant v. 
Stephens , 462 U .S. 862, 890 (1983)-
Gregg's principles continue to support 
pressing for careful instructions concern-
ing those aspects of the decision which the 
system (purportedly) guides more 
precisely . 
When an instruction is important, more-
over, one version of it may not be enough. 
The best possible instructions are likely to 
be the most open to objection from the 
prosecution, and if counsel has no fallback 
instructions prepared, wholly unobjec-
tionable aspects of the defense instructions 
may be lost in the shuffle. It is also possi-
ble that pressing for the best possible in-
structions will help persuade the court to 
grant at least the second-best- though 
pressing for too many ideal and unwin-
nable instructions may jeopardize counsel's 
credibility. 
While the decisions about whether and 
how vigorously to press for particular in-
structions are delicate ones, sad experience 
suggests that counsel should at least think 
very carefully before not raising any 
available legal claim. Death penalty trials 
can end in death sentences, and the fate of 
the defendant after that judgment is likely 
to depend in large measure on whether his 
trial attorneys have preserved the grounds 
for appeal. That may later save him. For 
the same reason, it is essential that all pro-
ceedings concerning instructions (and ob-
jections to them) be on the record. 
With these thoughts in mind, let us con-
sider more specifically what sentencing 
phase instructions should cover and how 
they can do so best. But first, these 
caveats: Many, probably most, of the in-
structions given as examples in the 
following pages embody strongly pro-
defense interpretations of the law; if these 
examples are offered in actual trials, 
counsel should be ready to respond with 
alternative formulations in case the court 
rejects the instructions suggested here. 
Similarly, the citations given in this arti-
cle are generally meant to provide a star-
ting point in seeking positive authority; 
counsel should be aware that there are 
many adverse decisions on these issues as 
well. Finally, the instructions suggested 
here are suggestions- in every case, 
counsel must decide which instructions will 
best serve the needs of the client, in light 
of the client's chances at trial and on 
appeal. 
Issues to Be Covered 
The issues that sentencing instructions 
need to address are as broad and complex 
as the issues of the capital sentencing deci-
sion itself. Space does not permit a discus-
sion in detail of the kinds of language 
defense counsel may need to seek on all 
of these issues. But it is possible to outline 
the topics that comprehensive capital in-
structions should cover and to address 
more thoroughly certain important themes 
in the instructions that defense counsel 
should proffer. 
The Life-or-Death Nature of the 
Sentencing Decision 
The very first instruction2 should im-
mediately remind the jurors that "their 
April 1986/the CHAMPION 21 
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task . .. [is] the serious one of determining 
whether a specific human being should die 
at the hands of the State." Caldwell v. 
Mississippi , supra, 86 L.Ed.2d at 240. 
They should be encouraged, in this instruc-
tion and throughout, to think of the defen-
dant as a person with a name, rather than 
"the defendant," and so he should always 
be referred to by his name (and perhaps 
as "Mr."). They should also be made aware 
of the nature of their choice, and so, if 
possible, the opening instruction should 
identify the method of death (rather than 
leaving execution as an abstraction). It 
should also identify the alternative to 
death, in as firm language as the state's law 
will support; for example, the alternative 
may be described as "life imprisonment," 
with further explanations, if any , of the 
availability of parole postponed until later. 
Thus an opening instruction might read: 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
it is now your duty to determine 
what punishment must be imposed 
upon (name of defendant) . You must 
determine which of the following 
punishments is appropriate to impose 
on (name of defendant): 
1) Life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole; 
or 
2) Death by electrocution.3 
The Basic Steps in the 
Sentencing Decision 
Before the jurors can understand the 
nature of aggravating or mitigating cir-
cumstances, or the burdens of proof apply-
ing to them, or a variety of other matters, 
they need a basic framework. Suppose we 
have a death penalty statute that requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of one 
statutory aggravating circumstance as a 
predicate for death-eligibility , and then 
2 . This discussion focuses on the instructions to be 
given after the evidence at the penalty phase has 
been presented. It may also be very helpful to 
have initial instructions to the jury before the 
sentencing hearing gets under way. Defense 
counsel should seek to insure that such initial in-
structions share the emphasis of the post-hearing 
instructions, as discussed throughout this article, 
on reinforcing the jury's caution about imposing 
death. 
3. Southern Poverty Law Center, Motions for 
Capital Cases 203 (1981 ). 
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provides for a weighing of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances to arrive at a final 
decision. It is important for the jury to 
know, first , that death is out of the ques-
tion unless a statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance is proven, and , second, that 
even if such a circumstance is shown, the 
question of sentence is still far from de-
cided. These points might be made this 
way: 
In deciding whether to sentence 
(name of defendant) to life imprison-
ment without parole or death by 
electrocution, you will first have to 
determine whether the state has pro-
ven beyond a reasonable doubt that 
a statutory aggravating circumstance 
exists in this case. (Name of defen-
dant) cannot be sentenced to death 
by electrocution unless each juror 
finds beyond a reasonable doubt the 
existence of one statutory aggra-
vating circumstance. I will explain 
what a statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance is shortly, but you should 
understand that the fact that you have 
found (name of defendant) guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
crime of murder in the first degree 
is not itself a statutory aggravating 
circumstance. 
Therefore, unless you unanimous-
ly find beyond a reasonable doubt at 
least one statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance, you cannot even con-
sider sentencing (name of defendant) 
to death . 
Even if you unanimously find the 
existence of one statutory ag-
gravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you are not then 
authorized to impose the death 
penalty on (name of defendant). This 
finding merely authorizes you to 
consider imposing the death sen-
tence . In deciding then whether to 
sentence (name of defendant) to 
death by electrocution, you are 
bound by law and by your oath as 
jurors to consider those mitigating 
circumstances which I will list for 
you later, and any other mitigating 
evidence which you find in the case, 
before imposing a sentence. 
It will then be your duty, in accor-
dance with the instruction I am about 
to give you, to make a moral assess-
ment of the circumstances of the case 
Narr• as they reflect on the ultimate ques-tion of life or death: whether (name 
of defendant) should be sentenced to 
life imprisonment without parole or .!~~OJ 
to death by electrocution.4 "~'"""" 
This instruction by no means vv•uv''"ffl•• vague, sc 
describes the weighing process that Qtbers m 
J·ury will carry out and on which but not~ J inrnrs. N_' tions are certainly needed. It may well J--bepenrut1 
valuable also to describe that weighing wbicb jur 
cess briefly here, if it is one that c:~r••h•'"' .. an aggra' protects defendants. If not, the · For ex~ 
given above offers a general guideline, a narrow 
meant to convey an overall sense of atrociom 
necessity of caution and care in the sen- specifyin! 
tencing process , and is compatible witha must invo 
variety of more specific instructions later deliberate 
concerning the details of the before d~ 
process . ~sary 
Definition and Proof of 
Aggravating Circumstances 
• 
if the instJ 
guiltphas 
circumsta 
mit a deat 
Juries often find aggravating cir aeithertOI 
cumstances in capital cases. It is ...,.,.,,"""""'• intended 1 
however, that jurors not be permitted employed 
rely on circumstances that are not Florida, 1 
or have not been adequately proven. lU!J serious e1 
instructions can help insure against by a mot 
risks , although counsel should bear in penalty fn 
that unduly elaborate instructions correctiv1 
ing aggravation themselves carry the rist Sometil 
of unintentionally focusing the jury's tion will · 
thoughts on the aggravating pie, it is ~ 
in the case. Ideally, instructions to the jUJ1 a murder 
on aggravating circumstances should: lion of ro 
1) narrowly and precisely define each 
aggravating circumstance; 
2) limit the aggravating circumstances 
that the jury will be allowed to consider; 
3) specify the burden of proof that mu.C 
be met by the State; 
4) explain the presumption of ir. mocence; 
and 
5) limit the evidence the jury may 
consider. 
4 . This instruction is drawn largely from theK~ 
tucky Public Advocate's Death Penalty M~ 
159 ( 1979) (hereinafter cited as Ken __ ~ 
Manual) ; Southern Prisoners' Defense Coo•"'" 
· ar~ tee et a! ., Supplemental Materials, Senun kiill 
Improving Special Criminal Defense S E--
(Nashville, TN, October 24, 1981), Part IV. 
at 8 [hereinafter cited as Seminar Mate~ 
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Rptr. 637 , 709 P.2d 440 (1985). 
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Narrow and Precise Definition 
ManY of the aggravating circumstances 
ified in modern death penalty laws are 
specgue some of them exceptionally so. 
va • Others may be clear enough to lawyers, 
b 1 not at all self-explanatory for lay 
.;ors. None of these ambiguities should k permitted if ~ey :xpa~d the grounds on 
which jurors rrught unagme they can find 
an aggravating circumstance proven. 
For example, counsel should press for 
8 narrowing definition of the "heinous, 
atrocious or cruel" circumstance-
specifying, p:rhaps, that s~ch an_ offense 
must involve torture, that IS, senous and 
deliberate physical abuse of the victim 
before death, or the pitiless infliction of un-
necssary pain on the victim. 115 Similarly, 
if the instructions defining homicide at the 
guilt phase and those de~ing aggravating 
circumstances at sentencmg appear to per-
mit a death sentence against a person who 
neither took life, attempted to take life, nor 
intended to take life or that lethal force be 
employed, in violation of Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), then this 
serious error should be challenged, both 
by a motion to bar or dismiss the death 
penalty from the case and, if that fails , with 
corrective instructions. 6 
Sometimes the issues needing clarifica-
tion will be more intricate. If, for exam-
ple, it is an aggravating circumstance that 
a murder was committed in the commis-
sion of robbery, it may be very important 
5. 
6. 
Cf State v. Sonnier, 402 So.2d 650, 659 (La. 
1981), cen. denied, 463 U .S. 1229 (1983); see 
also Mills v. State , 476 So.2d 172, 178-79 (Fla. 
1985) (per curiam) (opinion for Justices Ehrlich, 
Shaw, and perhaps Alderman) . 
After this article was in draft, the Supreme Court 
decided Cabana v. Bullock, 54 U.S.L.W. 4105 
(U.S. Jan. 21, 1986). The trial jury in Bullock's 
case had returned a death sentence on the basis 
of instructions that did not require it to find the 
level of culpability mandated by Enmund, but the 
Court held that this death sentence could still 
Stand "provided only that the requisite findings 
are made in an adequate proceeding before some 
appropriate tribunal- be it an appellate court, a 
trial judge, or a jury." /d. at4109. Probably most, 
1f not all, states will nonetheless continue to en-
trust this decision in the first instance to the trial 
sentencer. As a result, Bullock makes it all the 
more important that a sentencing jury be correctly 
lllSlructed- since a failure to give correct instruc-
hons may now be held to call only for appellate 
factfinding rather than for a new sentencing hear-
mg before a correctly instructed jury. 
-depending on the facts and evidence-to: 
1) instruct the jury on the elements of 
robbery, and direct them that they cannot 
find this aggravating circumstances unless 
they find that each of the elements of rob-
bery has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt; 
2) instruct the jury (if this is not a ques-
tion of law for the court) that the homicide 
must be an integral part of the commission 
of robbery, rather than, for example, 
merely close in time to the robbery, see 
generally, People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 
164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, 504-06 
(1980); or 
3) instruct the jury that they must find 
that the homicide was committed with the 
intent to aid the commission of the 
robbery. 
Undoubtedly there will be many other 
such issues revealed by a close reading of 
applicable statute and case law. It is im-
portant not to assume that state law will 
be unfavorable, for courts in such states 
as Florida, illinois, Louisiana, and Ten-
nessee have in fact sought to articulate 
careful definitions of aggravating factors. 
Even when state law is not helpful, federal 
constitutional law may call for narrowing 
constructions. See, e.g., Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).7 Where 
the facts raise these issues, they should not 
be overlooked. 
Limitation of Aggravating 
Circumstances 
In particular, counsel should seek to bar 
the jury from considering nonstatutory ag-
gravating circumstances (especially if state 
7 . I am grateful to James Liebman for identifying 
these sources of potentially useful case law. 
law supports this limitation). Even if state 
law permits consideration of nonstatutory 
aggravation, it may still be possible to nar-
row the range of nonstatutory cir-
cumstances that the jury will consider. 
Whatever the applicable rule on nonsta-
tutory aggravating circumstances, counsel 
should not overlook other possible limits 
on the circumstances that the jury can be 
instructed to consider. Moreover, "[w]here 
it is doubtful whether a particular ag-
gravating circumstance should be submit-
ted," counsel should maintain, with the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, that "the 
doubt should be resolved in favor of defen-
dant. " State v. Oliver, 274 S.E.2d 183, 
204 (N.Ca. 1981). There are a number of 
possible sources for such limits on ag-
gravating circumstances. 
First, in cases where a defendant has 
already gone through one or more penalty 
trials, any aggravating circumstance which 
was not found against him in the prior 
trial(s)-whether or not it was submitted 
to the prior sentencing judges or juries-
and any aggravating circumstance for 
which the evidence was ultimately held 
constitutionally insufficient (either in state 
or federal court) should be objected to on 
double jeopardy and heightened reliability 
grounds , see Young v. Georgia, 79 
L.Ed.2d 198 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); cf Jones 
v. Florida, 459 U.S. 891 (1982) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); 
State v. Silhan, 275 S.E.2d 450, 480-83 
(N.Ca. 1981). 
Second, double jeopardy, heightened 
reliability and due process, and equal pro-
tection concerns also can be invoked to 
support objections to aggravating cir-
cumstances that constitute elements of the 
offense of which the defendant has been 
convicted (such as an "in the commission 
of a felony" circumstance where the defini-
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tion of capital homicide is "killing in the 
course of specified felonies"), see Collins 
v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258, 261-65 (8th 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 
3375 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1985); State v. Cherry, 
257 S.E.2d 551, 567-68 (N.Ca. 1979), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980). 
Third, overlapping or duplicative aggra-
vating circumstances (e.g., that the murder 
was committed during a robbery and that 
it was committed for pecuniary gain, or 
that each of two concurrent murders is a 
"multiple murder" aggravating circum-
stance to the other) should also be resisted 
on similar grounds, see People v. Harris, 
36 Cal.3d 36, 60-67, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 
679 P.2d 433, 447-52 (1984) (plurality 
opinion), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 365 
(1984); State v. Goodman, 257 S.E.2d 
569, 586-88 (N.Ca. 1979); Cook v. State, 
369 So.2d 1251, 1256, 1258 (Ala. 1978); 
Provence v. State, 337 So.2d 783, 786 
(Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 
(1977) .8 
Fourth, aggravating circumstances that 
on their face or as applied require a jury 
that has just convicted the defendant of a 
murder to decide whether he committed 
another unrelated crime, for which he has 
not already been found guilty, should be 
resisted as risking prejudiced and unre-
liable decisionmaking, see State v. McCor-
mick, 397 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. 1979). At the 
least, counsel should press for a require-
ment that any such other crimes be pro-
ven beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf Peo-
ple v. Robertson, 33 Cal.3d 21, 188 Cal. 
Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279, 297-99, 303-04 
(1982) (plurality and concurring opinions). 
Finally, state or federal law may of 
course provide still other grounds for 
resisting the state's use of aggravating cir-
cumstances. Counsel should creatively ex-
plore, in particular, the possibility of 
formulating, and seeking instructions on, 
defenses to aggravating circumstances (re-
quiring, for example, that the defendant 
have been aware of his victim's status as 
a peace officer; or providing that facts 
showing duress, even though not sufficient 
to make out a guilt phase defense, suffice 
to negate an aggravated circumstance of 
8. Similarly, an instruction may be sought to pre-
vent the overlapping use of aggravating evidence. 
See text accompanying note 12 infra. 
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killing during an escape9) . 
Specify Burden of Proof 
Typical statutes require that the jury 
unanimously find at least one statutory ag-
gravating circumstance beyond a reason-
able doubt, and this limit should of course 
be repeated. It should also be made explicit 
that the jury cannot find additional ag-
gravating circumstances unless this same 
burden of proof is satisfied for each one. 
If possible, each juror should also be re-
quired not to take into account any other 
aggravating circumstances unless these, 
too, are found by the entire jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
In jurisdictions that permit nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances to be con-
sidered, counsel may want to seek instruc-
tions imposing the same limits on the 
jurors' consideration of these nonstatutory 
circumstances. Any such instructions, 
however, should be phrased carefully so 
as not to inadvertently encourage the jury 
to consider nonstatutory aggravating cir-
cumstances that it might otherwise have 
ignored. One formulation that has been 
suggested would tell the jurors that these 
limits must be satisfied "before you con-
sider any fact as an aggravating cir-
cumstance." 
The instructions should also explain the 
meaning of the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard, and should do so in terms 
that reinforce the jurors' sense of the grav-
ity of their responsibility . For example: 
In order to find that an aggravating 
circumstance has been proven to ex-
ist you must be convinced of its ex-
istence beyond a reasonable doubt 
and to a moral certitude. Proof of an 
aggravating circumstance beyond a 
reasonable doubt is evidence by 
which the understanding, judgment 
and reason of the jury are well 
satisfied and convinced to the extent 
of having a full, firm and abiding 
conviction that the circumstance has 
been proven to the exclusion of and 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
A reasonable doubt as to the ex-
istence of an aggravating cir-
cumstance may arise from the 
9. The latter was suggested by James Liebman. 
evidence presented or from the lack 
want or insufficiency of the prosecu~ 
tion's evidence. 
A reasonable doubt does not mean 
that you have to give yourself a 
specific reason for the doubt; it is 
sufficient that you are not convinced 
to an abiding certainty. 
If you have a reasonable doubt as 
to whether an aggravating circum-
stance is present, it is your duty to 
fmd that it is not present. 10 
Explain the Presumption of Innocense 
The presumption of innocence should be 
applied to each of the aggravating cir· 
cumstances considered by the jury, and, 
needless to say, should be phrased as 
firmly as possible. 
Limit the Evidence 
For example, instructions might fruit· 
fully state that the fact that an aggravating 
circumstance has been alleged against til 
defendant is not evidence of its existence, 
and should not be considered by til 
jury, 11 that the jury may not consider any 
evidence that is not relevant to one of til 
aggravating circumstances being submit· 
ted to it, or that circumstantial evidence 
alone is not sufficient to prove the ex· 
istence of an aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In addition, counsel may restate or sup-
plement their opposition to the use 
overlapping aggravating circumstancef 
with an instruction, as has been suggested. 
on these lines: "A fact which you 
as the basis for finding one aggravating 
cumstance may not also be considered bJ 
you as the basis for fmding another at 
gravating circumstance; you may consitkl 
the same fact in aggravation only once, 
more than once, even though it may 
within the definition of more than a 
aggravating circumstance which I 
read to you." 
10. See Kentucky Manual , supra note 4, at 160.61· 
For the last sentence, see New Mexico ~ 
Jury Instructions for death penalty cases, 
39.22 (1980 version). 
II . This instruction was suggested by TimothY g. 
Ford. 
12. See text accompanying note 8 supra. 
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Definition and Proof of 
Mitigating Circumstances 
Instructions on mitigating circumstances 
can help a defendant; they can also hurt. 
It is essential that these instructions 
highlight the defense case and its signifi-
cance for the jury's deliberations- and it 
is likely that standard instructions will fail 
to do this as well as they should. Instruc-
tions in connection with mitigating circum-
stances should: 
1) clarify the significance of mitigating 
circumstances in the jury's decision; 
2) identify and, if appropriate, explain 
both the statutory and non-statutory miti-
gating circumstances which the jury may 
consider; and 
3) explain the burden of proof on miti-
gating circumstances. 
Clarify the Significance of 
Mitigating Circumstances 
In an important series of cases, the 
Eleventh Circuit (formerly the "Fifth Cir-
cuit Unit B") has decided that the constitu-
tion generally requires instructions which 
explain to a jury " 'why the law allows ... a 
consideration [of mitigating circumstances] 
and what effect a fmding of mitigating cir-
cumstances has on the ultimate recommen-
dation of sentence." ' Dix v. Kemp , 763 
F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir. 1985). Signifi-
cantly, Dix adhered to this line of decisions 
despite the Supreme Court's determination 
in Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at 
890, that "the Constitution does not require 
a State to adopt specific standards for in-
structing the jury in its consideration of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances." 
See Dix, 763 F .2d at 1209 n.3 . 
A typical formulation of these points 
would be the following: 
I charge you that mitigating cir-
cumstances are those which, in 
fairness and mercy, may be con-
sidered as extenuating or reducing 
the degree of moral culpability or 
blame, and which, therefore, call for 
the imposition of a punishment less 
than the ultimate punishment. 13 
Counsel may want to tender even more 
13. See Seminar Materials, supra note 4, Part IV.E. , 
at 3 . 
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elaborate instructions, which explain, for 
example, that mitigating circumstances are 
those that tend to indicate that the deter-
rent or retrlbutive functions of punishment 
would not be served in this case. See Lieb-
man & Shepard, Guiding Capital Senten-
cing Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Platen: 
Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 
66 Geo. L.J. 757, 818-21 (1978) (hereafter 
cited as "Liebman & Shepard") . 
Explain Statutory and Nonstatutory 
Mitigating Circumstances 
Implicit in this guideline are seven im-
portant considerations. 
First , mitigating circumstances may be 
ambiguous . Even a seemingly clear factor 
such as "age" may well need explanation 
to highlight the range of ages that would 
count as mitigating or to highlight non-
chronological factors such as mental age 
that might bring a defendant within the cir-
cumstance. An explanation of the reasons 
that age counts as a mitigating factor- that 
the immaturity of a defendant tends to 
reduce his culpability and so to reduce the 
appropriateness of the ultimate penalty -
may also be useful . (Counsel should, how-
ever , be careful to frame these explana-
tions so as not to narrow inadvertently the 
range of mitigating material that the jurors 
understand they may consider and rely on 
as reasons for giving a life sentence.) 
Second, it is essential that mitigating cir-
cumstances that are not present in the case 
not be presented to the jury. Typical 
mitigation instructions may list, and sub-
mit, every mitigating circumstance, 
whether it is present or not; the effect may 
be to emphasize for the jurors the number 
of mitigating circumstances that are miss-
ing from the case before them. Moreover, 
statutory mitigating circumstances may be 
defined very stringently-for instance, to 
require "extreme emotional disturbance" to 
show mitigation. If counsel believe that the 
evidence does not meet the definitions of 
related mitigating circumstances specified 
in the statute, but that this evidence is 
nonetheless mitigating, then they may well 
want to prevent the statutory circumstances 
in question form being submitted to the 
jury, or at least to seek modifications in 
the statutory language that would normally 
be used in the instructions. 14 
Third, if the defense case rests in whole 
or in part on nonstatutory mitigating cir-
cumstances, it is extremely important that 
these be presented to the jury with the~ 
emphasis as statutory circumstances. 
Otherwise the jurors may infer that, COllJ. 
pared to the statutory circumstances, ~ 
nonstatutory circumstances are less irnpor. 
tant, or the jury is under less of an oblig. 
tion to consider them. An instruction 
directly telling the jurors to weigh and con. 
sider both sets of circumstances equally 
may be helpful . See generally People v. 
Lucky, _ Cal.3d_ (Dec. 31 , 1985). 
In State v. Johnson, 257 S.E.2d 597 
614-17 (N.Ca. 1979), the North Caro~ 
Supreme Court recognized that an instm:-
tion "put[ting] some mitigating circum-
stances in writing and leav[ing] others to 
the jury's recollection," id. at 616-17. 
might violate Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586 (1978), by effectively discouraging t1r 
jury from considering relevant mitigating 
circumstances. 
Fourth, it is a reality of capital trials thtf 
often the prosecution will be able to prove 
the existence of multiple aggravating f~ 
tors . While instructions can then be sougll 
that minimize the significance of merely 
counting the number of factors , it behooves 
defendants to seek to offer multiple miD-
gating factors as well. Often, this 
will require the presentation of nnr1otatll- • 
tory mitigating factors , and will also 
for the careful identification of the 
factors shown by the evidence. 
Fifth , counsel should always 
carefully the range of possible uu''"'"u ... 
circumstances, especially 
mitigating circumstances, in the case, 
seek instructions on those that seem 
ising . These can include, but are 
means limited to, an almost infinite 
of facts about the offender himself and 
circumstances of the crime. Another 
gating circumstance could be the 
of any remaining doubt about the 
dant's guilt, for such doubt, even if 
than a reasonable doubt, might still 
against death. Cf Smith v. Balkcom, 
F.2d 573 , 579-82 (5th Cir . Unit B 
modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 
14. Even if counsel believe that their Pvi<lenct:""'la 
satisfy the statutory standards, they 
challenge such stringently defined 
cumstances as unduly limiting the 
sideration of mitigating evidence, in 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
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(Sth Cir. Unit B).' cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
882 (1982) . A lighter sentence to a co-defendant might als? be viewed by a jury 
mitigating. So rmght the absence of an 
as . (fi . ggravating cucumstance or mstance, ~the defendant did not act for pecuniary 
gain). And t?e defendant~s behavior in 
·on since his arrest-which for a defen-:t on retrial, may have been years 
ago- may show evidence of rehabilitation 
or nondangerousness, for instance, that 
will be of mitigating value. The Supreme 
Court is now considering the admissibil-
ity of evidence of past and likely future 
good conduct of a defendant in prison in 
Skipper v. North Carolina, No. 84-6859, 
cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3252 (U.S. 
()ct. 15, 1985) . 
Sixth, the instructions should direct the 
jury to give consideration to those 
mitigating circumstances that it finds in the 
case. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 
114-15 (1982), declares that the sentencer 
"may determine the weight to be given 
relevant mitigating evidence. But [the 
sentencer] may not give it no weight by ex-
cluding such evidence from [its] considera-
tion"; this instruction implements this 
view. For similar reasons, counsel should 
seek instructions requiring the jury· to fmd 
the existence of those circumstances suf-
ficiently demonstrated by the evidence 
(under the applicable burden of proof) . Cf 
State v. Johnson, 257 S.E.2d 597, 617-19 
(N. Ca. 1979). (Instructions that direct the 
jury's attention to mitigating evidence, if 
permitted, may serve this same purpose to 
some extent.) If appropriate-for example, 
in a case in which the defendant is suffer-
ing from a mental illness which contributed 
to his offense-counsel should also seek in-
structions directing the sentencing jury to 
treat particular circumstances or evidence 
as mitigating rather than as aggravating. 
Cf Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at 
885. 
Seventh, the instructions should present 
lhe mitigating circumstances at issue in the 
case "in the most favorable light for the 
d~fendant. "1 ~ Defmitions of mitigating 
~urnstances, explanations of their mean-
m~ i~ the jury's deliberations, and, if per-
lllJsstble, references to the relevant 
evidence should all be drafted in light of 
!5. SeminarMaterials,supranote4, PartiV.E. al4. 
the actual strengths and weaknesses of the 
case. Instructions such as these are likely 
to be especially important when the miti-
gating evidence is liable to be misunder-
stood or disregarded- as may be the case, 
for example, with evidence of mental ill-
ness, which jurors may be reluctant to 
credit or to view as mitigating. Support for 
such instructions may be found, in such 
cases, not only in death penalty jurispru-
dence but in general principles concerning 
"prophylactic instructions on ... confusing 
or prejudicial evidence." Liebman & 
Shepard, supra, at 819-20 n.275. 
An instruction briefly accomplishing 
several of these objectives might read as 
follows: 
The Court instructs the jury that 
in deciding whether to sentence 
(name of defendant) to life imprison-
ment without parole or to death by 
electrocution, you are bound by law 
to consider all of the mitigating cir-
cumstances presented by the de-
fense, and any other mitigating 
circumstances that you find in the 
case. That is, you should focus your 
attention on those aspects of the case, 
and in particular those characteristics 
of the defendant, which, in fairness 
and mercy, may be considered as ex-
tenuating or reducing the degree of 
moral culpability or blame, and 
which, therefore, call for the imposi-
tion of a punishment less than the 
ultimate punishment. Thus, you 
must consider the following factors 
as evidence of mitigation if you 
believe from the evidence that they 
are present: 
1. (Name of defendant) acted 
under extreme duress or under the 
substantial domination of another 
person, _____ _ 
2. (Name of defendant) did not 
strike the fatal blow which caused 
the death of the victim. 
3. The age of (name of defendant), 
20, at the time of the crime, and the 
resultant immaturity that would 
reasonably be expected to contribute 
to his criminal conduct. 
4. (Name of defendant)'s coopera-
tion with the police. 
5. (Name of defendant)'s prior 
family history, including his having 
been abused physically and emo-
tionally as a child, that would 
reasonably be expected to contribute 
to his criminal conduct. 
6. (Name of defendant)'s low in-
telligence and his suffering from 
chronic depression that would rea-
sonably be expected to contribute to 
his criminal conduct. 
7. Any other circumstance which 
you consider mitigating even if I 
have not mentioned it. 
It may well be helpful to elaborate on 
the last item on the list ("any other cir-
cumstance"), particularly if the court 
refuses to identify nonstatutory mitigating 
circumstances in its charge to the jury. 
Such an elaboration might declare: 
The mitigating circumstances 
which I have read for your consid-
eration are factors that you may take 
into account as reasons for deciding 
to impose a sentence of life impri-
sonment. You should pay careful at-
tention to each of those factors. Any 
one of them, standing alone, may be 
sufficient to support a decision that 
life imprisonment is the appropriate 
punishment for (name of defendant). 
However, you should not limit your 
consideration of mitigating circum-
stances to the specific mitigating cir-
cumstances mentioned. You may 
also consider any other circumstance 
relating to the case or to (name of 
defendant) as reasons for imposing 
a sentence of life imprisonment. 16 
Explain Burden of Proof on 
Mitigating Circumstances 
The instructions to present on the burden 
of proof depend, of course, on what this 
burden of proof is, and what party bears 
it. Ideally, the answer might be that the 
state must disprove beyond a reasonable 
doubt any mitigating circumstance on 
which the defense proffers evidence. This 
rule would implement the requirement of 
heightened reliability in death penalty 
cases, see, e.g., Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) 
(plurality opinion), by borrowing the stan-
dard developed to insure reliability in 
determining "the degree of criminal 
16. Seminar Materials, supra note4, Part IV.E., at 
6. 
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culpability" at the guilt stage of even the 
most mundane capital cases, Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975). 
Unfortunately, arguments for this stan-
dard have not fared very well in the courts; 
as a practical matter, it will be essential to 
offer alternative instructions embodying 
less favorable burdens of proof. These in-
structions should also explain the meaning 
of the various formulas used, if such ex-
planations will be helpful to the defense . 
For example, counsel might offer the 
following instructions (beginning with the 
first or second and presenting the later 
ones, in order, if the court rejects those 
already presented) :17 
If you have a doubt about the ex-
istence of a mitigating circumstance 
then you shall find that that miti-
gating circumstance exists. 
The prosecution must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the nonex-
istence of each of the mitigating 
circumstances which I have listed for 
you before you can find that such 
circumstance does not exist. [Here 
include a strong definition of 
reasonable doubt.] If you have a 
reasonable doubt as to whether a 
mitigating circumstance has been 
proven not to exist, it is your duty 
to fmd that it is present. 
In order for you to find the ex-
istence of a mitigating circumstance 
it does not have to be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt to exist. You 
must find the existence of a miti-
gating circumstance if there is any 
evidence introduced to support it. 
[Counsel may wish to vary this in-
struction or prepare a fall-back ver-
sion, by adding a clause such as 
"unless you are firmly convinced 
from all of the evidence in the case 
that this circumstance does not 
exist.1 
In order for you to find the ex-
istence of a mitigating circumstance 
it does not have to be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt to exist. You 
must fmd the existence of a miti-
gating factor if the existence of that 
factor is in any degree more likely 
than not. [Here it may be helpful to 
17. See Kentucky Manual , supra note 4 , at 162-63. 
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formulate further instructions em-
phasizing how modest this burden of 
proof is , or the jurors' duty to adhere 
to it.] 
In addition, these instructions should 
seek to ensure that each juror is free to con-
sider as mitigating any factor that he or she 
views as such, even if other jurors do not 
agree that the factor is present or do not 
view it is mitigating. If individual jurors 
are denied this freedom , counsel should 
seek at least to ensure that a mitigating cir-
cumstance is deemed to be present (and so 
must be considered by the entire jury in 
its weighing decision, or at least may be 
considered by any juror) so long as a mere 
majority (rather than the entire jury) find 
it to be present. Finally , such instructions 
should seek to insure that jurors are free 
to consider mitigating evidence, even if 
they do not find on the basis of that 
evidence that a mitigating factor has been 
proven to the requisite level of proof. See 
Stebbing v. Maryland, 83 L.Ed. 2d 212 , 
214-15 (1984) (Marshall , J ., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) . 
Clarify the Nature of the 
Weighing Process 
Modern death penalty statutes must 
direct the jury's attention to the considera-
tion of both aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors present in the case. Unfortunately, 
current doctrine does not consider it essen-
tial for this purpose that "specific standards 
for balancing aggravating against miti-
gating circumstances" be fashioned , nor, 
apparently, that these factors be "explicitly 
balanced against each other." See Zant v. 
Stephens , supra, 462 U.S. at 875 & n.13 
(discussing the Georgia and Texas death 
penalty statutes). 
Nonetheless , many , if not most, state 
statutes do explicitly provide for some 
form of balancing process. Even in those 
states that do not, defense counsel may be 
able to win instructions that offer consider-
able clarification of the role and signifi-
cance of mitigating circumstances, or of 
other aspects of the sentencing decision, 
and proffering such instructions is likely 
to be useful strategy. 
In the discussion that follows , however, 
I will assume that the applicable law does 
expressly provide for a weighing of ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances. 
The establishment of a weighing process 
may be helpful for defendants, but it hardly 
guarantees an adequate consideration of~ 
circumstances that should argue agaim1 
death. As a result, instructions should see( 
to ensure that the weighing process is ~ 
tilted towards execution. For this purpose 
instructions on the following points a~ 
likely to be helpful. 
The Decision Before the Jury 
Is Not a Mechanical One 
A number of state laws provide that after 
the jury has found a statutory aggravating 
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it "shall" sentence the defendant to death 
unless the mitigating circumstances out-
weigh the aggravating circumstances. Such 
"presumptions of death" should be attacked 
as violations of the teaching of Woodsorr 
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), 
which prohibited mandatory death penalty 
statutes, and of Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586 (1978), which required that sentence:rs: 
not be precluded from considering any 
propriate circumstances offered in 
tion. Justice Marshall has also pointed 
see Maxwell v. Pennsylvania, 83 L.Ed. 
306 , 308-09 (1984) (Marshall , J., dissen-
ting from denial of certiorari), that sucb 
statutes can undermine the jurors' full 
recognition of the oral responsibility they 
bear in death sentencing, by focusing 
on relatively mechanical issues peripheral 
to the true question of life or death 
potential violation of the teaching 
Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, which 
sists on the importance of the jurors' 
recognizing this responsibility . 
response to these problems is to seek 
structions which shift the weighing 
mula, for example to require that 
gravating circumstances be shown 
outweigh mitigating circumstances, and 
will set out such instructions in the 
subsection. 
Another response , however, is to 
clear to the jury that it is never under a 
to impose death unless it concludes as 
matter of its own independent moral · 
ment that death is the appropriate 
Instructions such as these are likely to 
useful whatever the weighing formula is-
at least unless the defense is confident 
a more formulaic application of the 
ing standard will result in a sentence 
than death. This response is strongly 
ported by the California Supreme 
recent decision in People v. Albert Brown, 
suPra note 4, 40 Cal.3d 512 (1985); cf 
StaJe v. McDougall, 301 S.E.2d 308, 
325-26 (N.Ca.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
865 (1983). Instructions on this point might 
say for example: 
' As I have already explained to 
you, if you find that the state has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
the existence of one or more ag-
gravating circumstances, it will then 
be your duty to weigh any aggra-
vating circumstance or circum-
stances that you fmd against any 
mitigating circumstances that you 
find in the case. I charge you that 
your weighing of these circum-
stances should not consist of merely 
adding up the number of aggravating 
circumstances and mitigating cir-
cumstances. Rather, each juror is 
free to assign whatever moral or 
sympathetic value he or she deems 
appropriate to each and all of the 
various factors you are permitted to 
consider. 
[By directing that the jury "shall" 
impose the death penalty if it finds 
that aggravating factors "outweigh" 
mitigating] (use the bracketed words 
only if necessary), the law should not 
be understood to require or even to 
permit any juror to vote for the death 
penalty for (name of defendant) 
unless, upon completion of the 
weighing process, he or she decides 
that death is the appropriate penalty 
under all the circumstances. 
Moreover, the law does not intend · 
that (name of defendant) be sen-
tenced to death if the jury merely 
fmds more bad than good about him 
or to permit life imprisonment with-
out parole only if it fmds more good 
than bad. The weighing of aggra-
vating and mitigating circumstances 
must occur within the context of 
these two punishments -life impri-
sonment without parole, or death by 
electrocution-and the balance is not 
between good and bad but between 
life and death. Therefore, to return 
a death judgment, each juror must be 
persuaded that the "bad" evidence is 
~ substantial in comparison with the 
good" that it requires death instead 
of life without parole. 
Instructions should also make plain that 
multiple aggravating circumstances do not 
necessarily call for the death penalty, and 
that a single mitigating circumstance may 
call for a lesser penalty. 
The Issues and the Burdens 
Earlier sections of this article have 
already discussed desirable instructions on 
two burden of proof issues: the burdens of 
proof of the existence of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances. It is possible to 
identify three distinct issues that may re-
main for the jury's consideration at the 
"weighing" stage, and on at least two18 of 
these, instructions on the burden of proof 
may be helpful. 
The relative weights of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances. 
Counsel should press for instructions 
that preclude death unless the jury finds 
that the aggravating circumstances clear-
ly outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 
Another formulation, of similar import, 
would direct the jury that "[i]f the weight 
of the mitigating circumstances approaches 
or exceeds the weight of the aggravating 
circumstances then you cannot sentence 
(name of defendant) to death by electrocu-
tion. "19 Without such provisions as these, 
juries are free to impose death even when 
the relevant circumstances are actually or 
nearly in equipoise. 
Whatever the "weighing" formula, 
counsel should also press for a "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard. This standard 
can be justified even if the courts decide 
that "weighing" is not "fact-finding," for the 
effect of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard should be to insure that the jurors, 
as they should, treat the weighing decision 
with just as much seriousness as they 
would the factfinding in a regular case. Ac-
cordingly, jurors could be charged, for ex-
ample, that "unless you find that the state 
has shown beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the aggravating factors outweigh the 
mitigating factors in this case, you cannot 
sentence (name of defendant) to death by 
18. The only possible exception would be the issue 
of mercy, to which a "burden of proof" instruc-
tion may not readily apply. 
19. See Kentucky Manual at 163. 
electrocution." See State v. Wood, 648 
P.2d 71, 83-85 (Utah), cert. denied, 459 
U.S. 988 (1982). As in every burden of 
proof context, counsel should be ready 
with fall-back instructions if the most 
favorable language is rejected. 
The question of whether to grant mercy. 
Death penalty systems may explicitly 
authorize capital juries to grant mercy. 
Even under statutues that do not, however, 
defendants can argue for a right to jury 
consideration of mercy on the grounds that 
without such a right jurors may be pre-
cluded from giving mitigating circum-
stances the weight they otherwise would, 
in violation of the teaching of Lockett v. 
Ohio, supra. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Penn-
sylvania, 83 L.Ed. 2d 306, 308 (1984) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari); cf Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 
1449, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1985) (en bane) 
(U.S. Appeal or petition for certiorari 
pending). If it is possible to establish that 
the jury is authorized to grant mercy, then 
it may well be important to make sure that 
the jur; is aware of this power. An instruc-
tion on mercy might read: 
I charge you that if you see fit, and 
regardless of your findings on the 
other issues I have set out for you, 
you are always free to afford [there 
JURY SELECTION 
Sciences 
• Profiles 
• Voir Dire Questions 
• Surveys 
• Consultation 
Excellent 
References 
P.O. Box 1395 
Cotuit, Mass. 02635 
(617) 428-8537 
April 1986/the CHAMPION 29 
is nothing that prevents you from af-
fording] (name of defendant) mercy 
in these proceedings and sentencing 
him to life imprisonment without 
parole. 
You may grant mercy to (name of 
defendant) regardless of the evidence 
presented to you and even if you 
have not found the existence of any 
mitigating circumstances. 
This decision is solely in your 
discretion and not controlled by any 
rule of law. Each juror may decide 
to grant mercy to (name of defen-
dant), with or without a reason. 
You may in particular decide to 
grant mercy to the defendant because 
of [here describe the mitigating cir-
cumstances as proffered in the 
case]-2° 
Just as it is important to inform the jurors 
of their power to grant mercy, it is impor-
tant to resist instructions that might obscure 
this power or otherwise interfere with the 
jury's full consideration of mitigating cir-
cumstances. Traditional instructions to 
render a verdict without consideration of 
sympathy, or without regard to the conse-
quences, should therefore be resisted-a 
position endorsed by the California 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., People v. Albert 
Brown, supra note 4. 
The overall appropriateness 
of a death sentence. 
The corollary of the effort to resist a 
mechanical weighing process is the view 
that the jury should not be able to return 
a death verdict based on a mere weighing 
of aggravating and mitigating cir-
cumstances but instead should be required 
to address directly the question of the ap-
propriateness of life or death for the defen-
dantY If the jury is responsible for 
20. See Southern Poverty Law Center, Motions for 
Capital Cases 208 (1981); Seminar Materials , 
Part IV .E . at 9 . 
21. If the weighing process has already ruled out the 
death penalty, of course, there would be no 
reason, and possibly no statutory authorization, 
for the jury to reach this final question. Counsel 
should seek instructions which make clear to the 
jurors that decisions at various early or in-
termediate steps of the decisionrnaking process 
will resolve the case by precluding the possibility 
of a death sentence. 
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sentencing, a failure to put this ultimate 
issue squarely before them may be said to 
undermine their sense of responsibility for 
the decision as well as their attention to the 
significance of mitigating factors or 
grounds for mercy. 
Justice Stevens expressed his concern 
that the issues put to the jury not distort 
their decisionmaking in Smith v. North 
Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (Stevens, 
J., opinion respecting the denial of peti-
tion for certiorari). Stevens' opinion quotes 
from State v. Wood, supra, 648 P.2d at 83. 
In light of Wood, and of State v. 
McDougall, supra, 301 S.E.2d at 327-28 
(McDougall is North Carolina's response 
to Stevens' opinion in Smith), counsel 
might seek the following instruction, 
perhaps buttressed with further instructions 
reminding the jury of the non-mathematical 
nature of their decision: 
In order to impose a death 
sentence, you must be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
totality of the aggravating circum-
stances outweighs the totality of the 
mitigating circumstances. If you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the aggravating circum-
stances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances, you must return a 
verdict of life imprisonment. 
In order to impose a death sen-
tence, you must further be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
imposition of the death penalty is the 
only justified and appropriate 
sentence in the circumstances. If you 
are not convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the imposition of the 
death penalty is the only justified and 
appropriate sentence in the ' cir-
cumstances, again you must return 
a verdict of life imprismynent. 
The jury's understanding of the care with 
which it should approach a possible sen-
tence of death can be further reinforced 
with instructions on the presumption of in-
nocence, or on what could be called the 
death sentencing corollary of the presump-
tion of innocence- the presumption of im-
prisonment. An instruction on this issue 
might read: 
The law presumes (name of defen-
dant) innocent of the aggravating cir-
cumstances alleged against him, and 
the law, consequently, presumes that 
the appropriate sentence for the of-
fense of whic~ (na"!e ?f ~efendam) 
has been convtcted ts hfe tmprison-
ment without parole. 
You are further instructed that this 
presumption alone is sufficient tore-
quire you to sentence (name of 
defendant) to life imprisonmem 
without parole unless you conclude 
beyond a reasonable doubt; that onl; 
the sentence of death is appropriate 
for (name of defendant). 
The Consequences of Nonunanimity 
Under many statutes, the death o""'-""' 
can only be imposed if the jury 
mously agrees to it; if the jury is split, 
result is not a new trial but a sentence 
imprisonment. Given the 
pres.sures for agreement inside the 
room, it is important for jurors syn1patbdkll 
to the defendant to understand the 
quences of their decisions. Otherwise, 
bitrary pressure for unanimity may 
in a death verdict in a case in which 
munity sentiment, as reflected in the 
would not call for execution. Even · 
law prohibits instructions on this 
counsel generally should seek them 
order to preserve this issue for 
A strong statement of this point 
be: 
In order to return a sentence of 
death , it is absolutely necessary that 
all twelve (12) jurors agree on that 
sentence. 
If any juror does not believe the 
sentence of death is warranted under 
these instructions, then a sentence 
life imprisonment without 
will be imposed. 
For the same reason, defense 
should contend that the jury's 
agree after a reasonable time 
sentence of life imprisonment (even 
law does not so provide). And for 
the same reasons, counsel normally 
vigorously resist any "Allen" or 
charge designed to press the jury 
unanimity. 
The Meaning of the Possible 
There are two critical concerns 
First, it is important that the jury 
stand that a death verdict means the 
dant's death- rather than being 
some form of symbolic gesture. It 
therefore, to hav.e the jury instruc~ 
your deliberations on the questiOn 
r .... 11nlSilll"'"'' you are to presume that if 
ntence (name of defendant) to death, 
se be executed by electrocution." 
it is essential that the jury not 
that the alternative to death is a 
iillisttmem of no more than a few years' 
There are three possible 
of insuring against such misunder-
If the alternative punishment is fixed 
Jaw at "life imprisonment without 
it may be best to leave this 
precisely as it is, on the theory 
it is already as clear as it can be. 
b) If the penalty is only "straight life," 
may ask for an instruction telling 
jury "to presume that if you sentence 
of defendant) to life imprisonment, 
will spend the rest of his life in prison. 
are to make no other presumptions." 
method assumes that the jurors will 
willing, after hearing this instruction, 
put aside their suspicions about parole 
commutation. 
c) If the issue of parole cannot be so 
dispelled, it may be best to meet it 
To do so, one commentator has 
;:'JUJ~e.!ited, counsel in such situations 
seek instructions telling the jury not 
that it should presume that life im-
}• 1· prisorunent indeed is imprisonment for 
life, but also that in considering this 
sentence the jurors should not assume that 
lhe defendant will ever be paroled from it; 
lhat the question of parole is committed to 
a responsible official agency with a duty 
to protect the public; and that the jury 
should not imagine that such an official 
agency will fail to do its duty to refuse 
parole in any case in which the public 
safety would not be fully protected if 
parole were granted. 
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Reinforce the Jury's 
Sense of Responsibility 
The Supreme Court in Caldwell v. 
Mississippi, supra, 86 L.Ed. 2d at 239-40, 
~phatically confirmed the constitutional 
IDlportance of the jurors' sense of moral 
~~nsibility. This sense of responsibil-
1~ Is easily diluted; indeed, many jurors 
Wil! arrive with it diluted in advance, by 
tberr .vague, and perhaps inaccurate, im-
~Slons of the likelihood of review by the 
trial judge or by courts on appeal. It may 
well be helpful, therefore, to seek an in-
struction on these lines:22 
You are instructed that this court 
has no option in the present case to 
impose any sentence other than the 
sentence recommended by you, the 
jurors.23 • 
This instruction should be sought even 
in states where the jury's recommendation 
is in fact subject to review by the trial 
judge, on the ground that informing the 
jury of the prospect of this review will 
make their contribution to the sentencing 
process less reliable and responsible. Even 
in states which explicitly inform the jurors 
that their decision is only a recommenda-
tion, it may well he helpful to seek instruc-
tions which emphasize the gravity of mak-
ing such a recommendation, and the 
limited circumstances (if they are limited) 
under which the jury's recommendation 
will be overturned. 
Counsel should be careful, however, not 
to leave the jurors with the impression that 
a death verdict will receive further review, 
while a verdict of life will be final- for that 
perspective would tempt jurors to render 
purely symbolic verdicts of death. 
The Verdict Form Should Reinforce 
the Instructions 
Particularly if the instructions are not 
provided to the jurors in writing, the only 
written reflection of the court's instructions 
that the jurors will have with them during 
deliberations will be the verdict form. 
Needless to say , it is essential that the im-
plicit or explicit messages of the verdict 
form reinforce the scrupulous caution 
about imposing death towards which all of 
the defense instructions will have aimed. 
The precise contents of the verdict form 
may well need to vary, depending on the 
facts of the case and the likely concerns 
of the jurors (as well as on the re-
quirements of state law). Whenever (and 
in whatever respects) counsel believe that 
the jury's performance will be enhanced by 
a clearer understanding of the steps they 
are to undertake in reaching a verdict, 
22. This instruction is taken from Seminar Materials , 
Part IV .E. , at II. 
23 . This instruction would probably need to be har-
monized with an instruction on nonunanimity, 
if the latter were given as well . 
however, it is likely to be helpful and 
arguably constitutionally necessary for the 
verdict form itself to remind the jurors of 
the information counsel wish them to 
remember. 
The jurors may be required, for exam-
ple, to determine the existence of ag-
gravating circumstances; determine the 
existence of mitigating circumstances; 
weigh them together; determine whether 
to grant mercy; and determine, ultimately, 
whether life or death is the appropriate 
sentence. If so, then the verdict form might 
well require the jury to state its decision 
on each of these issues, and might also-
if this information would be helpful-
remind them of the burden of proof that 
must be met as to each one. 
For similar reasons, it may be ap-
propriate to require the jury to state ex-
plicitly in the verdict form, for each 
aggravating circumstance, whether it 
found that circumstance present or absent. 
This requirement of explicitness may be 
useful in clarifying the record for appeal, 
and it may also force the jurors to focus 
more thoroughly on each of the circum-
stances in question. It is less clear, 
however, that a similar requirement as to 
mitigating circumstances would be advis-
able, since the more rigidly the jurors deci-
sion on mitigation is structured the less free 
jurors may feel to give appropriate weight 
to nonstatutory, even inarticulate, factors 
calling for life. 
Again for similar reasons, it may be 
useful to require each juror to sign a ver-
dict of death. The same requirement could 
also be imposed on intermediate decisions 
(such as the presence of aggravating cir-
cumstances) that contribute to the ultimate 
verdict on death. 
The following verdict form embodies 
rather stringent quidance on the various 
steps in the sentencing decision:24 
SAMPLE VERDICT FORM 
Circle the appropriate alternative 
in each question that you answer. 
Begin with the first question; do not 
go on to subsequent questions if you 
24 . I am grateful to James Liebman for many sug-
gestions which I have incorporated in drafting 
this form, and for his pointing out the critical 
importance of the verdict form itself. 
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are instructed not to do so based on 
your answers to earlier questions . 
1. (We unanimously fmd) (We do 
not unanimously find) beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the aggravating cir-
cumstance of 
as alleged.25 
Foreman 
UNLESS YOU FIND THE EXIST-
ENCE OF AT LEAST ONE AG-
GRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE 
BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT, (NAME OF DEFEN-
DANT) WILL BE SENTENCED 
TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT 
WITHOUT PAROLE. IN THAT 
CASE, DO NOT ANSWER ANY 
FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
* * * 
2. (We unanimously find) (We do 
not unanimously find) by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the 
mitigating circumstance of __ 
does exist.26 
Foreman 
* * * 
3. (We unanimously fipd) (We do 
not unanimously find) beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the aggravating 
circumstance(s) we have found 
outweigh the mitigating circum-
stance(s) we have found . 
Foreman 
UNLESS YOU UNANIMOUSLY 
FIND BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT THE AGGRA-
VATING CIRCUMST ANCE(S) 
WHICH YOU HAVE FOUND 
OUTWEIGH THE MITIGATING 
25. Provide a separate question for each aggravating 
circumstance. 
26 . Provide a separate question for each statutory and 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstance proffered 
by the defendant . 
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CIRCUMST ANCE(S) WHICH 
YOU HAVE FOUND, (NAME OF 
DEFENDANT) WILL BE 
SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRI-
SONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE. 
IN THAT CASE, DO NOT 
ANSWER ANY FURTHER 
QUESTIONS. 
* * * 
4. (We unanimously agree) (We 
do not unanimously agree) that 
mercy should not be granted to 
(name of defendant) . 
Foreman 
UNLESS YOU UNANIMOUSLY 
AGREE THAT MERCY SHOULD 
NOT BE GRANTED TO (NAME 
OF DEFENDANn, (NAME OF 
DEFENDANT) WILL BE 
SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRI-
SONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE. 
IN THAT CASE, DO NOT 
ANSWER ANY FURTHER 
QUESTIONS. 
* * * 
5 . (We unanimously agree) (We 
do not unanimously agree) beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the imposi-
tion of death in the manner provided 
by law on (name of defendant) is 
justified and appropriate in the cir-
cumstances of this case. 
Foreman 
IF YOU DO NOT UNANIMOUS-
LY AGREE THAT THE IMPOSI-
TION OF DEATH IN THE MAN-
NER PROVIDED BY LAW ON 
(NAME OF DEFENDANT) IS 
JUSTIFIED AND APPROPRIATE 
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THIS CASE, (NAME OF DEFEN-
DANn WILL BE SENTENCED 
TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT 
27 . Provide a separate line for the signature of each 
juror. 
WITHOUT PAROLE. IN THAT 
CASE, YOU ARE NOT TO 
ANSWER ANY FURTHER 
QUESTIONS. 
* * * 
6 . (We unanimously agree) (We 
do not unanimously agree) that 
(name of defendant) should be 
sentenced to death in the manner 
provided by law. 
Foreman 
DO NOT ANSWER QUESTION 6 
UNLESS THE JURY HAS (I) 
FOUND AT LEAST ONE AG-
GRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE 
BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT; (2) FOUND BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT 
THE AGGRAVATING CIR-
CUMST ANCE(S) YOU HAVE 
FOUND OUTWEIGH THE 
MITIGATING CIRCUM-
ST ANCE(S) YOU HAVE FOUND; 
(3) FOUND UNANIMOUSLY 
THAT MERCY SHOULD NOT BE 
GRANTED TO (NAME 
DEFENDANn; AND (4) ~~· .. rn " 
THAT THE IMPOSITION OF 
DEATH PENALTY ON 
OF DEFENDANT) IS .~ ....... ,..,=, 
AND APPROPRIATE IN 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
CASE, BEYOND A 
ABLE DOUBT , AND 
FOREMAN HAS SO 
BY COMPLETING THE 
TIONS ABOVE AND 
HIS OR HER NAME 
EACH QUESTION. 
Conclusion 
This article does not by any means 
all of the instructions that may 
helpful in a capital case. That task is 
that only the lawyers in each case 
accomplish- and that they must 
complish in order to safeguard the 
and the life, of their client. 
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